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17 September 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: DDCI

SUBJECT : NIO Meeting of 16 September

HH *Good memo*

1. On Thursday, Dick Lehman kicked off what is to be a regular monthly occasion: a one hour meeting of the DCI with all the NIOs. Each NIO had about six or seven minutes to touch on outstanding points involving his area, as follows:

a. [] Formal U.S.-Soviet relations are dead in the water. This is partly because of the U.S. election campaign. The Soviets feel compelled to react critically to the recommendations by each candidate advocating continued high level of defense spending. The Soviets also wish to wait until after the election for certain important matters such as the signing of a SALT agreement. The Soviets appear concerned that Kissinger might achieve success in Africa, and hence their propaganda has been nasty in a personal way toward him. [] It's a bad period for détente.

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The theory of a "senior core" of Soviet leadership still seems valid. The New First Deputy Premier, Tikhonov, is 71 years old and a Brezhnev crony. Ustinov, the new Defense Minister, though younger than Grechko, is no spring chicken.

All analysts assume that with the death of Mao the Soviets will attempt to improve Sino-Soviet relations, but no one is sure how. There is some agreement that the Soviets will probably try to rush things and be rebuffed.

b. Jim Lilley: Stated that he had been briefing John Glenn on the latter's pending trip to China. []

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[] The Senator flew in China shortly after the war. Also, Lilley is working on a study of the implications of the large scale Chicom maneuver in the Taiwan straits. Thirdly, Lilley is concerned over the attention the Taiwan problem is receiving in the media and the academic world. He feels this will tie our hands in certain respects, for example, []

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X1 c. [] Had little to say. Thought that whatever would happen in Japan as a result of yesterday's Cabinet shake-up would happen slowly. Refused to prognosticate on Kim Il Song's life span.

X1 d. [] Stated that Kissinger's trip added such a major additional confusing element that he could not discuss South Africa sensibly. Added that he was looking into the

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X1 e. [] Stated that NIE on Arab-Israeli Military Balance had been received well around town, but that he is exploring new methodologies to attack this problem, []

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g. Bob Hopkins: Said that after agreeing that CIA would give Congresswoman Sullivan an oral briefing, the NSC had sent over a rather abbreviated outline to be the "basis" for that briefing. DCI told Hopkins to tell his NSC contacts that we felt in no way constrained by their outline.

h. Howard Stoertz: Said that the next two months would be the crunch on 11/3, the interagency intelligence memorandum on civil defense, and, in general, the disagreement between ourselves and the military as to whether the Soviets were building towards

X1 uncontestable nuclear superiority, or whether their motives
were "mixed." Added that under the coordination of []
[] intelligence officers from CIA, DIA, and State were
participating in various teams that have been established to
draft the Soviet threat assessment requested in the recent
NSSM from the President.

X1 2. [] was absent and [] passed.

